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Abstract
Existing models of parental investment have mainly focused on interactions at the level of the family,
and have paid much less attention to the impact of population-level processes. Here we extend classical
models of parental care to assess the impact of population structure and limited dispersal. We find that
sex-differences in dispersal substantially affect the amount of care provided by each parent, with the more
philopatric sex providing the majority of the care to young. This effect is most pronounced in highly
viscous populations: in such cases, when classical models would predict stable biparental care, inclusion
of a modest sex difference in dispersal leads to uniparental care by the philopatric sex. In addition, mating
skew also affects sex-differences in parental investment, with the more numerous sex providing most of
the care. However, the effect of mating skew only holds when parents care for their own offspring. When
individuals breed communally, we recover the previous finding that the more philopatric sex provides
most of the care, even when it is the rare sex. We conclude that sex-biased dispersal is likely to be an
important, yet currently overlooked driver of sex-differences in parental care.
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Introduction
Although mothers and fathers share a common genetic stake in the survival of their young, their evolutionary
interests are rarely fully aligned (Parker, 1979; Arnqvist and Rowe, 2005; Wedell et al., 2006). Each parent
typically stands to gain if the other bears more of the costs of raising the young, leading to sexual conflict
over the provision of parental care (Trivers, 1972; Parker et al., 2002; Houston et al., 2005; Lessells, 2012).
Such conflict is thought to be an important driver of between-species variation in forms of care (Kokko and
Jennions, 2008) and is associated with a range of conspicuous behaviors, such as brood concealment (Valera
et al., 1997), infanticide (Hrdy, 1979; Hausfather and Hrdy, 1984), brood desertion (Székely et al., 1996;
Van Dijk et al., 2007) and negotiation between parents over care (e.g., Schwagmeyer et al., 2002; Smiseth
and Moore, 2004; Hinde and Kilner, 2007).
Over the years, a substantial body of theory has been developed to explain the evolution of parental
care (for reviews see Houston et al., 2005; Alonzo, 2010; Lessells, 2012), focusing chiefly on behavioral
interactions within the family (e.g., negotiation or coercion between parents [Houston and Davies, 1985;
McNamara et al., 1999, 2003; Johnstone and Hinde, 2006; Lessells and McNamara, 2012; Johnstone et al.,
2014] or between parents and helpers [Johnstone, 2011; Savage et al., 2013]). This emphasis on interactions
at the family level can perhaps be attributed to the self-contained nature of the family-unit, which allows
researchers to concentrate on the behavior of a small number of family members in the context of a clearly
defined “nursery” environment (Mock and Parker, 1997). However, the downside of such a narrow focus
is that the potential impact of processes at the population level has been largely ignored in existing models
of parental investment. So far, the only population-level process that has received much attention is the
feedback between parental investment and mate availability (Parker and Simmons, 1996; McNamara et al.,
2000; Kokko and Johnstone, 2002; Kokko and Jennions, 2008; Alonzo, 2012). The possible influence of
other population-scale processes on the provision of care remains poorly understood.
Dispersal is one such population-level process, which is thought to influence the resolution of other forms
of family conflict (e.g., genomic imprinting [Haig, 2000; Van Cleve et al., 2010; Úbeda and Gardner, 2010],
parent-offspring conflict [Kuijper and Johnstone, 2012], female harming [Rankin, 2011; Wild et al., 2011;
Faria et al., 2015] and infanticide [Lion and Van Baalen, 2007]). The importance of dispersal in the familial
context raises the question of whether it might also affect the outcome of sexual conflict between parents
over care. In related contexts such as sex allocation, sex-biased dispersal is well known to result in conflict
between males and females over the sex ratio (Wild and Taylor, 2005). In addition, models that focus
on more abstract social behavior (e.g., helping and harming) have shown that sex-differences in dispersal
can favor substantial asymmetries in helping behaviors between the two sexes (Johnstone and Cant, 2008;
Gardner, 2010). Given that sex-biases in dispersal are common in the animal kingdom (Greenwood, 1980;
Greenwood and Harvey, 1982; Lawson Handley and Perrin, 2007), it seems likely that patterns of dispersal
might provide useful insights into the evolution of uniparental and biparental care.
Here, we set out to examine the impact of sex-biased dispersal on parental care, in particular on sex-
differences in parental investment. We build on the classical theoretical model of biparental care by Houston
& Davies (Houston and Davies, 1985) embedding it in a demographically explicit framework familiar from
models of social evolution in structured populations (Taylor, 1988, 1992; Rousset, 2004; Gardner and West,
2006; Lehmann et al., 2006; Johnstone et al., 2012).
The model
A demographical model of parental care Our approach is to develop an evolutionary demographic model
(Hamilton, 1964a; Taylor and Frank, 1996; Rousset, 2004; Taylor et al., 2007; Lion et al., 2011) of the pro-
vision of care to a brood by male and female parents. Consider a population distributed over infinitely many
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territories (Wright, 1931, 1951), in which individuals reproduce sexually and generations are overlapping.
Each territory contains nf adult female breeders and nm adult male breeders. Time proceeds in a series of
discrete breeding seasons, during each of which a given female mates at random within her patch to produce
a large number of offspring, in a 1 : 1 sex ratio (see section S3 in the Online Supplement which shows that
sex ratio biases do not affect sex-differences in care). We assume that all males on the patch have identical
mating success. When nf = nm, this could entail a female pairing up with a randomly chosen local male, and
that male fathers all her offspring, or each of a female’s offspring might be fathered by a randomly chosen
male; both scenarios give identical results. When nf 6= nm, the latter interpretation is more natural and is
assumed to apply here.
The individual parental efforts of males and females are given by um and uf respectively, and the number
of surviving offspring b(uf,um) depends upon the combined efforts of both parents. Following the classical
model by Houston and Davies (1985), we assume that male and female efforts contribute additively to
offspring survival. In addition, we assume that the number of surviving offspring b(uf,um) measures effort
at the level of a single brood: consequently, we need to weigh a male’s contribution to the current brood by
his expected number of mates nf/nm, so that a male’s effort to a single brood is given by um/ nfnm . Hence,
offspring survival can be written as b(uf,um)≡ b(uf +um nmnf ).
Following classical models of parental investment (Trivers, 1972, 1974; Parker and Macnair, 1978;
Parker et al., 2002; McNamara et al., 2003), we assume that b increases, at a diminishing rate, with an
increase in either parent’s level of effort ux, x ∈ {m, f} (so that ∂b/∂ux > 0 and ∂2b/∂u2x < 0). In addition,
an increased level of parental effort ux is assumed to come at a cost to the parent’s future fitness, through
an increase in its mortality probability µx ≡ µx(ux) (Trivers, 1972). Again, in accordance with previous
models (e.g., McNamara et al., 2003; Johnstone and Hinde, 2006), we assume that parental mortality in-
creases in accelerating fashion with an individual’s effort ∂µx/∂ux > 0 and ∂2µx/∂u2x > 0. To generate
the figures below, the fecundity of a pair with effort levels uf and um is given by the decelerating function
b(uf + nmnf um) = 1− exp[−(uf +
nm
nf
um)] (e.g., see Parker and Macnair, 1978; Houston and Davies, 1985). The
mortality µi(ui) of individuals of sex i is given by the accelerating function (e.g., McNamara et al., 2003)
µi (ui) = ki+ (1− ki)u2i , where ki reflects the baseline mortality per breeding season and 1−ki the strength with
which the square of sex-specific effort u2i increases mortality.
Of all offspring produced during each time step that survive, a fraction hm of sons and a fraction hf of
daughters remain on the natal patch, while fractions dm = 1− hm and df = 1− hf disperse to other randomly
chosen patches. After dispersal, offspring on a patch (both native and immigrant) compete for any breeding
vacancies created by the mortality of adult members of their own sex. The offspring that fail to claim a
breeding vacancy die, after which the same sequence of events is repeated in the next time step.
Selection gradients To model the evolution of male and female parental care, we use an adaptive dynam-
ics approach (Rousset, 2004; McGill and Brown, 2007; Dercole and Rinaldi, 2008). This method assumes
that evolutionary change in female and male care levels uf and um occurs through the successive invasion
and substitution of mutations of slight effect. For the sake of simplicity, uf and um are represented by hap-
loid, autosomal gene loci with full recombination between them (although individual-based simulations with
diploid inheritance give identical results, see below). Moreover, we assume sex-limited expression, so that
uf and um are only expressed in females and males respectively. In the Appendix, we derive fitness expres-
sions W (uf + δuf;uf,um) and W (um + δum;uf,um) for the fitness of a mutant female and male respectively.
The mutant females and males have care levels uf + δuf and um + δum respectively, in a resident population
that has female care levels uf and male care levels um. When mutations in male and female care levels oc-
cur independently (i.e., no pleiotropy), the rate and direction of evolutionary change in uf and um, is then
proportional to the selection gradients ∂W (uf + δuf;uf,um)/∂δuf and ∂W (um + δum;uf,um)/∂δum evaluated
at δuf = δum = 0. Expressions for these selection gradients are derived using a neighbour-modulated fitness
(also called a ‘personal fitness’) approach (Hamilton, 1964b; Taylor and Frank, 1996; Taylor et al., 2007;
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Gardner et al., 2011) in the Appendix. Consequently, we can solve for the equilibrium levels of female and
male care (u∗f and u
∗
m) at which both selection gradients vanish.
Individual-based simulations We also ran individual-based simulations to corroborate our analytical re-
sults. We simulated a population of 2000 patches, each containing nf female breeders and nm male breeders.
Each individual bears two unlinked, diploid loci uf and um. Similar to the analytical model, we assume sex-
limited expression, so that uf and um are only expressed in females and males respectively. The two alleles at
each gene locus determine the value of uf (or um) additively (no dominance or epistasis). Each allele mutates
with a per-generation probability of ν = 0.01. In case a mutation occurs, a random number is drawn from
a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ2ν = 0.0001 and added to current allelic value. During
each time step, a female produces M ova, where M = 200. Each ovum is then fertilized by a randomly sam-
pled male that lives in the local patch, after which offspring sex is assigned randomly (offspring are born as
male with a 50% probability). Subsequently, we allow each newborn offspring to survive with probability
b(uf +um nmnf ). When parents only care for their own offspring, uf and um are the phenotypes of the offspring’s
genetic mother and father. When parents care communally, uf and um are the phenotypes of a randomly sam-
pled female and male, which both live the local patch. Male and female offspring subsequently disperse to a
random patch with probability dm or df or remain at the natal patch with probability 1−dm and 1−df. After
the offspring production stage, female and male breeders die with respective probabilities µm(um) and µf(uf).
In case of a death, a new offspring is randomly sampled from the pool of immigrant and local offspring in
each patch, after which the next time step begins. Simulations ran for 100000 generations. The simulations
are coded in C and are available at http://dx.doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.168166.
Results
For the sake of brevity, we only treat a numerical analysis of our model in the main text. However, the reader
interested in formal results can consult the Appendix, where we provide expressions of the equilibrium levels
of male and female care and how they are affected by dispersal and mating skew.
Result 1: the philopatric sex provides more care to the brood
Figure 1 provides a simple illustration of the effect that sex-differences in philopatry can have on the levels
of parental effort provided by males and females: in contrast to classical models (Houston and Davies, 1985;
McNamara et al., 2003), which predict that both parents should invest equally in their young (Figure 1A),
even modest sex-biases in philopatry lead to the more philopatric sex (males in this example) providing the
majority of care to young (Figure 1B). Stronger sex-biases in philopatry can even lead to scenarios in which
the philopatric sex effectively become sole carers, while the contribution by the dispersing sex to the brood
is negligible (Figure 1C).
Why does sex-biased dispersal have such marked effects? Previous models of the evolution of repro-
ductive effort in asexual populations have shown that greater effort is selectively favoured, at a cost to adult
survival, when dispersal is more limited (Pen, 2000; Ronce and Promislow, 2010; Johnstone and Kuijper,
2014). The same holds true in populations with two sexes: where males are the philopatric sex, for example,
they value the production of offspring more relative to their own survival, thus selectively favouring higher
levels of male care. By contrast, the dispersing sex, in this case females, value their own survival more rel-
ative to the production of offspring, selectively favouring reduced levels of female care. These effects arise
because, in dying, an adult of the philopatric sex is likely to free up a breeding vacancy that may be occu-
pied by a local, related offspring; this indirect, kin-selected benefit partially offsets the cost of death (see the
Appendix for analytical results). By contrast, when an adult of the dispersing sex dies, the vacancy created
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is more likely to be filled by an unrelated, immigrant offspring. Hence, due to sex-biases in dispersal, the
trade-off between adult survival and offspring production diverges between the sexes. As a result, sex-biases
in parental care are likely to arise.
The finding that the more philopatric sex provides more care to young is robust to variation in absolute
sex-specific dispersal probabilities, provided that the direction of sex-specific bias is unchanged, as shown
in Figure 2. The effect is most pronounced when a single breeding pair occupies a patch (Figure 2A). With
a larger number of breeding pairs per territory, the overall sex difference in care may be less pronounced (as
relatedness to young is reduced due to the presence of other breeding pairs), but the most philopatric sex still
provides the majority of care (Figure 2B).
Result 2: the commonest sex does not always provide more care
Next, we consider the effect of mating skew, where the number of female breeders in a patch differs from
that of the male breeders, nf 6= nm. When individuals care only for their own offspring, Figure 3A-C shows
that the more numerous sex provides the majority of care to the young (see Figure S3A-F for corresponding
absolute values of female and male effort). Taking a scenario where females are the more numerous sex as
an example (Figure 3A), males sire two broods on average (as there are twice as many females as males), yet
males only provide the minor share of care to each of their young. For example, the um/(um +uf) = 0.25 line
in Figure 3A illustrates that the total amount of care that males give to young throughout their life constitutes
25% of the total amount of lifetime effort given by both females and males.
The result that the commonest sex (females in this case) provides most of the care is in line with previ-
ous results (Kokko and Monaghan, 2001; Kokko and Johnstone, 2002; Kokko and Jennions, 2008; Houston
et al., 2005): for the common sex, investment in survival is less advantageous as it faces increased competi-
tion over future breeding opportunities, thus favouring increased investment in current reproductive output.
Nonetheless, the amount of care provided by each sex is still affected by sex differences in dispersal, as
levels of sex-specific care increase with philopatry (contour lines in Figure 3A-C).
Things are different, however, when we consider a scenario of communal care, in which individuals
provide care to all locally born offspring. Figures 3D, F show that effect of mating skew (causing the more
common sex to provide more care) is now markedly reduced relative to that of sex-biased dispersal (see
Figure S3G-L for corresponding absolute values of female and male effort). Only when dispersal patterns
are relatively similar across both sexes (i.e., close to the line hm = hf), do we find that mating skew determines
which sex provides most of the care. Otherwise, we retrieve the notable result that the more philopatric sex
provides most of the care.
Why do we find that dispersal (rather than the adult sex ratio [ASR]) typically determines which sex
provides most care in communal breeders? As mating skew still causes the more numerous sex to face
increased competition for future breeding opportunities, we would still expect increased investment in current
reproductive output. However, the benefits of such investment in current reproductive output are substantially
lower in communally breeding taxa, as parents now also provide care to offspring other than their own. This
is particularly the case for parents of the more numerous sex, as an individual parent of the more numerous
sex has a lower genetic share in any locally born offspring, relative to a parent belonging to the rarer sex. As
a consequence, the benefits of current parental investment by the commoner sex are now diluted, so that the
effects of the ASR are largely undone. By contrast, sex-differences in dispersal still drive sex-differences
in parental care, as a breeder of the philopatric sex is still more likely to be replaced by a relative than the
dispersing sex, thus reducing the effective mortality cost of care as in result 1.
7 Dispersal and sexual conflict over care
Result 3: the more philopatric sex cares more despite higher costs
Well-established predictions on sex-biases in care often focus on differences in costs and constraints between
the sexes (Houston and Davies, 1985; Gross and Sargent, 1985; Liker and Székely, 2005), which raises the
question how sensitive our conclusions are to asymmetries in costs between the sexes. For an example
scenario where females remain at the natal site with probability hf = 0.8, Figure 4 varies the mortality cost
of male care relative to female care, (1− km)/(1− kf) (see Figure S4 for the corresponding absolute values
of female and male effort). When males nearly always disperse (hm→ 0) while females are philopatric, the
proportion of male care rapidly decreases with increasing mortality costs of male care. Consequently, we
find that males provide equal or less care to young than females do (proportion of male care falls below black
line of equal effort between the sexes), despite lower mortality costs of male care relative to female care (i.e.,
(1− km)/(1− kf)< 1). As females are the more philopatric sex, they value production of offspring more than
their own survival, causing them to provide more care in the face of high female costs of care. By contrast,
for taxa with high levels of male philopatry (hm≈ 1), Figure 4 predicts that males provide the majority of care
despite that males face mortality costs that are up to 1.5 times higher than those in females. Consequently,
sex-biased dispersal can mask the effect that sex differences in cost have on the relative amount of care that
males and females provide to their young.
Discussion
Our analysis reveals that sex differences in dispersal can have a substantial effect on the resolution of sex-
ual conflict over parental care: when females are the dispersing sex, our model predicts that males should
typically invest more in caring for young. Conversely, when males are the dispersing sex, females should in-
vest more in care. These predictions contrast strikingly with those of classical models assuming well-mixed
populations (e.g., Houston and Davies, 1985); the impact of sex-biased dispersal may even be sufficient to
destabilize biparental care and lead to uniparental care by the philopatric sex (see Figure 1). Although the
effect of sex-biased dispersal can be outweighed by that of mating skew in certain breeding systems (such
that the more common sex provides most of the care, even if it is more prone to dispersal; Figure 3), all other
things being equal, parental investment by a given sex increases with the relative level of philopatry of that
sex.
Our prediction that the philopatric sex provides more care could be tested using available data on parental
care and sex-biased dispersal in well-studied taxonomic groups. By our knowledge, all meta-analyses on the
selective causes of sex-differences in parental care focus on birds (Olson et al., 2008; Liker et al., 2013), so
we discuss the ramifications of our model below in the context of birds. Nonetheless, we emphasize that
evolutionary transitions between female-only, male-only and biparental care also occur in fish, reptiles and
amphibians (Goodwin et al., 1998; Balshine, 2012), and given the recent accumulation of studies on sex-
biased dispersal in these groups (e.g., Palo et al., 2004; Liebgold et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2012; Hutchings,
2003) assessing the consequences of our model should be a goal of future meta-analyses.
In birds, existing studies mainly focus on the role of polygamy and the adult sex ratio (ASR) as drivers
of sex differences in parental care (Olson et al., 2008; Liker et al., 2013). Notably, these studies find that the
ASR is strongly correlated with sex-differences in care (i.e., the more common sex provides more care), in
line with previous models (McNamara et al., 2000; Kokko and Johnstone, 2002; Kokko and Jennions, 2008)
and the current study (at least when communal care is absent). However, studies have yet to consider the
role of dispersal as an additional explanatory variable. Our model suggests that the role of sex-biased disper-
sal may be particularly important for those species in which biases in the ASR and polygamy/polygyny are
small or absent, yet still have substantial biases in parental care. One intriguing case in point from a meta
analysis by Liker et al. (2013) is the red-necked phalarope (Phalaropus lobatus), in which parental care is
heavily male-biased (Rubega et al., 2000) while biases in the ASR are absent (Hildén and Vuolanto, 1972;
8 Dispersal and sexual conflict over care
Reynolds et al., 1986; Whitfield, 1990) (see Table S5 in Liker et al., 2013). Notably, red-necked phalaropes
are characterized by male-biased philopatry (Reynolds and Cooke, 1988; Schamel and Tracy, 1991), and our
model suggests that this favors male biases in parental care. By contrast, the other species from the dataset by
Liker et al. (2013) in which biases in the ASR are absent is the semipalmated plover (Charadius semipalma-
tus), which has biparental care (Sullivan Blanken and Nol, 1998; Nol and Blanken, 2000) and, interestingly,
identical rates of philopatry between the sexes (Nol et al., 2010). As most non-communally breeding species
live with only a single male and female per territory, our model suggests that philopatry can have substantial
effects (see Figure 2A). However, in case territory structure is weaker or multiple breeders breed in a single
territory, effects of philopatry only lead to limited (but nonetheless measurable) sex-differences in parental
care (see Figure 2A). Hence, these examples suggest that more should be done to relate sex-differences in
dispersal to quantitative estimates in parental care.
Future studies should also consider communally breeding species, as our model predicts that the ASR
has a much weaker effect on sex-differences in care in those taxa (see Figure 3). In birds, a particularly
interesting group to consider are joint-laying species like ratites (greater rhea, tinamou or ostrich), in which
the ASR is female-biased (Donald, 2007), yet the father is the sole carer of the young (Vehrencamp and
Quinn, 2004). Those patterns of care are difficult to reconcile with models exclusively relying on the ASR
(McNamara et al., 2000; Kokko and Johnstone, 2002; Kokko and Jennions, 2008), so assessing the potential
role of dispersal would be welcome in those taxa. In other joint-laying species, numbers of males and
females at the nest appear more evenly distributed so the role of the ASR as a driver of sex-differences in
care might be less important relative to dispersal (see table 11.1 in Vehrencamp and Quinn 2004). Numerous
studies suggest that female-biased dispersal is the norm in these taxa (Greenwood and Harvey, 1982; Koenig
et al., 2000; Eikenaar et al., 2008; Sankamethawee et al., 2010), suggesting that males should provide the
majority of care. While little is known about sex differences in care by the dominant breeders, it is known
that male helpers predominate in these species (Brown, 1987; Cockburn, 1998; Haig, 2000). Consequently,
this corroborates the result by the current study (see also Johnstone and Cant, 2008; Gardner, 2010) that
the more philopatric sex is typically the one that is more likely to engage in cooperative behavior than the
dispersing sex.
The impact of limited dispersal on the evolution of parental care offers many possibilities for future exten-
sions of this model. For example, would be interesting to assess whether the conclusion that the philopatric
sex is always more cooperative extends to a broader range of social behaviors, such as social learning (Verz-
ijden et al., 2012), defense of the local group (e.g., Kitchen and Beehner, 2007) or the establishment of
dominance hierarchies (e.g., Kappeler, 1993). Next, future studies should consider the coevolution of sex
differences in parental care with other traits (McNamara, 2013), such as sex-biased dispersal (Perrin and
Mazalov, 2000; Lehmann and Perrin, 2003; Gros et al., 2008). In the absence of any sex-specific fitness
consequences of parental effort, however, investment in care should affect competition among kin of both
sexes equally and is thus unlikely to lead to sex-differences in dispersal. Only when parental care is more
beneficial to offspring of a particular sex (Lessells, 2002), is parental effort more likely to lead to sex-biases
in dispersal.
Another extension would be to assess the coevolution of the primary sex ratio with parental care. Sec-
tion S3 in the Online Supplement therefore explores the simplest possible scenario where primary sex ratio
coevolves with parental care, when parents care for their own young only. With regards to the primary sex
ratio itself, we recover a previous result that the sex ratio is biased towards the dispersing sex in viscous
populations (Hamilton, 1967; Bulmer and Taylor, 1980; Taylor, 1981; Frank, 1986; Taylor, 1994; Wild and
Taylor, 2004; Pen, 2006). However, the presence of parental care causes the primary sex ratio to be more
strongly biased towards the dispersing sex. The necessary assumption of overlapping generations (as current
reproduction trades off with mortality: Trivers, 1972) causes an increase in relatedness among competing ju-
veniles (e.g., Irwin and Taylor, 2001) relative to well-known sex allocation models assuming non-overlapping
generations (e.g., Hamilton, 1967; Taylor, 1981). To avoid such increased competition between relatives, in-
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creased investment towards the dispersing sex is therefore selectively favored, explaining the more strongly
biased sex ratios in the current model.
What is the effect of such a biased primary sex ratio on the equilibrium level of care in each sex? Adding a
biased sex ratios to fitness equations (S1-S12) shows that selection on sex-specific parental care is unaffected
by a biased sex ratio, as any sex ratio terms in the numerator and the denominator cancel out against each
other (see also Johnstone and Cant, 2008). Consequently, we conclude that sex-differences in parental care
are robust to any biases in the primary sex ratio. This raises the question when biases in the sex ratio would
start to affect patterns of parental care. In line with all other models on life-history evolution in viscous
populations (e.g., Úbeda and Gardner, 2010; Rankin, 2011; Úbeda and Gardner, 2011, 2012; Van Cleve
et al., 2010; Faria et al., 2015), we currently assume that the primary sex ratio does not change the number of
adult breeding positions claimed by each sex. This is realistic when the number of adult breeding positions
is environmentally determined, for example through sex-differences in juvenile mortality (Clutton-Brock
et al., 1985; Kokko and Monaghan, 2001; Kokko and Jennions, 2008; Pongou, 2013), differences in resource
demand (Bateman, 1948; Ruckstuhl, 2007; Elliott Smith et al., 2015) or other ecological differences between
the sexes (Slatkin, 1984; Shine, 1989) that determine the effective number of territories. However, future
studies should consider scenarios where the primary sex ratio indeed affects the number of competing adults
of each sex, as we would then predict that biases in the sex ratio affect sex differences in life-history traits
like parental care or other life history traits. Note however, that all this assumes that parents are actually able
to bias the sex ratio, whereas this is not a certainty given constraints like chromosomal sex determination
(West et al., 2005).
This assumption of a fixed number of female and male breeding positions is frequently used to show
how competition among relatives of each sex shapes sex-differences in social behavior (Johnstone and Cant,
2008; Gardner, 2010; Johnstone et al., 2012) and life-history traits (e.g., Wild and Taylor, 2005; Úbeda
and Gardner, 2010; Rankin, 2011; Úbeda and Gardner, 2011, 2012; Van Cleve et al., 2010; Johnstone and
Kuijper, 2014; Faria et al., 2015). However, in reality, it may not be the case that habitats are always saturated.
It would thus be interesting to assess the evolution of parental care in populations that are less limited by the
available amount of resources. Models on the evolution of social traits that assume a more elastic population
structure find, for example, that elasticity reduces the negative effect of local competition (e.g., Lehmann
et al., 2006; Alizon and Taylor, 2008; Lion and Gandon, 2010; Lion, 2010). As a consequence, we would
predict that elastic population sizes would likely diminish the evolution of sex differences in parental care.
Nonetheless, as habitat saturation has been repeatedly associated with the evolution of extended parental
care (e.g., Emlen, 1982, 1995; Russell et al., 2004; Brown et al., 2010), we think that fixed population sizes
are a real and interesting ecological feature in many populations.
Another assumption in most life-history models that consider overlapping generations (e.g., Kokko and
Monaghan, 2001; Kokko and Johnstone, 2002; Wild, 2006; Johnstone and Cant, 2008; Van Cleve et al.,
2010; Úbeda and Gardner, 2012; Kokko and Jennions, 2008) is that once adults have established themselves
as breeders, they do not experience any competition from juveniles. To give an example of why such adult-
juvenile competitive interactions can be important, consider the result in Figure 3A-C, in which we show
that the rarer sex provides less care and lives longer. In the presence of adult-juvenile interactions, however,
any longer-living adult will experience more competitive attempts from juveniles during its lifetime, which
reduces the reproductive value of an adult of the rare sex. In addition, when primary sex ratios are equal, there
will be more juveniles competing for each breeding position occupied by the rare sex relative to those of the
common sex, again reducing the reproductive value of an adult of the rarer sex. In section S1 of the online
supplement, we therefore analyze an extension of the current model that includes the effect of such adult-
juvenile interactions on the mortality rates of each sex. Importantly, including adult-juvenile interactions
does not alter our conclusion that sex-specific care increases with the degree of philopatry of that sex (see
Figure S1). However, adult-juvenile interactions indeed weaken the effect of the ASR on sex-differences
in care relative to Figure 3 (see Figure S1A-C). Moreover, in the presence of communal care (in which the
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effect of the ASR is already weakened, as set out in the main text in Figure 3D-F), juvenile-adult interactions
can lead to scenarios where the rarer sex provides more care than the commoner sex, which is opposite
to well-established predictions (see Figure S1D-F). Hence, direct competition between adults and juveniles
can potentially reduce (or even reverse) the effect of the ASR. Consequently, our model shows that adult-
juvenile interactions are a hitherto overlooked aspect of competition in overlapping generations that should
be included in future studies. In essence, adult-juvenile interactions are analogous to a ‘birth-death’ model
in continuous time (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006; Taylor, 2010), where the occurrence of new births result in a
mortality pressure on adults. The model considered in the main text, however, is analogous to a ‘death-birth’
model (Ohtsuki and Nowak, 2006; Taylor, 2010), where mortalities are the driving demographical force, and
births occur after breeding positions are vacated by mortality. We believe, however, that both demographical
descriptions apply to different taxa and that neither can be said to be more general than the other. Therefore,
more studies that place demography central to the evolution of family conflict are necessary to make sense
of the great variation in family life histories in nature.
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Appendix: analytical results
Baseline scenario: optimal effort in well-mixed populations
To fix ideas, we first focus on a simple ‘baseline’ scenario in which the number of breeding adults per patch
is identical for both sexes, n = nf = nm, and in which males and females care only for their own offspring (i.e.,
no communal breeding: Brown, 1978; Cant, 2012), so that the survival of an individual offspring depends
only upon the efforts of its own father and mother. Later on, we relax these assumptions.
For a well-mixed population (hf = hm = 0), we then find that the equilibrium parental efforts u∗f and u
∗
m
of mothers and fathers satisfy:
µ′m
(
u∗m
)
µm
(
u∗m
) = b′um (u∗f +u∗m)
b
(
u∗f +u∗m
) (A1)
µ′f
(
u∗f
)
µf
(
u∗f
) = b′uf (u∗f +u∗m)
b
(
u∗f +u∗m
) , (A2)
where µ′x(ux) reflects the derivative of mortality cost µx
(
u∗x
)
of parental care to sex x and b′ux(u
∗
f +u
∗
m) reflects
the partial derivatives of parental effort with respect to the variable ux. Although results below are phrased
in terms of mortality and fecundity, note that we can also derive our results in terms of reproductive value.
For example, the denominator on the left hand side can be written in terms of adult reproductive value, with
vm = 1/µm and vf = 1/µf (see the Supplementary Information, section S2.3 for a derivation). The respective
left hand sides can then be written as v′m/vm and v′f/vf, reflecting the marginal costs of reproduction in units
of each sex’s reproductive value. Similarly, v j = 1/b
(
u∗f +u
∗
m
)
reflects the reproductive value of a surviving
offspring, so that the right-hand side can be written as v′j/v j, representing the marginal benefit of reproduction
in terms of reproductive value (see also Pen, 2000). The question then becomes whether sex-differences in
dispersal affect the marginal benefits and costs of reproduction, which is what we assess below.
Optimal effort in viscous populations
To assess the effect of limited dispersal, let hf = 1−df (and hm = 1−dm) be the probabilities that a female (and
male) remains at the natal patch. To assess the effect of mating skew skew, we note that males can possibly
sire, on average, offspring from multiple females and hence provide care for multiple broods (when males
are rare, nm < nf) or sire only part of a brood of a single female (when males are common, nm > nf) and thus
only care for that part of the brood. As the offspring survival function b(·) measures effort at the level of a
single brood, we thus need to weigh a male’s contribution by his expected number of mates nf/nm, so that
we have b(uf +um/ nfnm ). We then obtain (see section S2 of the Supplementary Information):
[
rself − rf→locally competing juv
] µ′f (u∗f )
µf
(
u∗f
) = 2[rf→own juv − rf→competing juv] b′uf
(
u∗f +
nm
nf
u∗m
)
b
(
u∗f +
nm
nf
u∗m
) (A3)
nf
nm
[
rself − rm→locally competing juv
] µ′m (u∗m)
µm
(
u∗m
) = 2[rm→own juv − rm→competing juv] b′um
(
u∗f +
nm
nf
u∗m
)
b
(
u∗f +
nm
nf
u∗m
) . (A4)
The left-hand side shows that the proportional increase in parental mortality due to a slight increase in effort
by each sex is weighted by the difference between rself, which denotes the relatedness of the focal breeder to
itself (rself = 1), and rx→locally competing juv, which denotes the relatedness of a focal breeder of sex x to locally
competing juveniles of the same sex, one of which will replace the focal breeder when it dies. On the right-
hand side, the proportional increase in offspring survival due to a slight increase in parental effort is weighted
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by twice the difference between rx→own juv, which denotes the relatedness of a focal to its own juvenile
offspring and rx→competing juv, which denotes its relatedness to offspring competing with its own young (the
factor of two appears because in a sexual population every parent produces on average two offspring, one of
each sex). Note that these relatedness coefficients depend, in turn, on a number of demographical parameters,
including the sex-specific dispersal probabilities hf and hm, the sex-specific mortality rates µm(um) and µf(uf)
and the numbers nm,nf of adult males and females in the patch (see Supplementary Information, section
S2.4). In addition, mating skew affects the equilibrium balance also directly, given that the left-hand side of
eq. (A4) is multiplied by nf/nm.
Note that the equations (A3,A4) above reduce to those of a well-mixed population (eqns. [A1,A2]) when
there is no philopatry (hf = hm = 0) and mating skew is absent (nf = nm). In this case, rf→own juv = rm→own juv =
1
2 , rf→locally competing juv = rm→locally competing juv = rf→competing juv = rm→competing juv = 0, so that coefficients on
both sides are equal to 1.
Effect of sex differences in dispersal What happens, however, when hm,hf > 0? In line with Figure
1, we consider a scenario in which males are more philopatric than are females (hm > hf). Now, a male’s
average relatedness rm→locally competing juv to locally competing juveniles of his own sex increases compared to
a female’s average relatedness rf→locally competing juv to juveniles of her own sex. The left-hand side in eq. (A4)
therefore becomes smaller relative to the left-hand side in eq. (A3). One can interpret this as a decrease in the
effective mortality cost of care for males compared to females, due to the fact that in dying, a male breeder
is more likely than is a female to free up a breeding spot for a related offspring. However, inspecting the
right-hand side of eq. (A4), hm > hf also entails a decrease in the marginal benefits of increased male effort.
This is because the term rm→competing juv becomes larger, as a philopatric male who raises more surviving
young is also more likely than is a female to displace related offspring. The balance between these two
effects, however, favors greater parental effort by the more philopatric sex (here males), because it can be
shown that rm→competing juv on the right-hand side is smaller to an order (h2f +h
2
m)/hm relative to the coefficient
rm→local juv on the left-hand side (see eqns. S28, S30). As a result, male-biased philopatry leads males to
increase their level of parental effort, while females reduce theirs.
Effect of mating skew
When males are the more common sex, the left hand side in eq. (A4) is reduced relative to that in eq. (A3),
so that an increase in male parental effort has a smaller effective mortality cost relative to an increase in
female effort. Selection thus favors greater caring effort by males when they are the more common sex (and
a lower caring effort when they are the rarer sex).
In addition, mating skew has a more subtle, indirect effect on parental effort, by modulating the related-
ness coefficients. When males are the more common sex, individual males have a lower genetic share in the
next generation in the local patch (as they compete more strongly for matings), thus reducing a male’s related-
ness rm→locally competing juv to any locally competing juveniles. Vice versa, the coefficient rf→locally competing juv
for females is increased, as individuals of the rare sex have a greater genetic share in the next generation. In
dying, males are therefore less likely to be replaced by a related juvenile in comparison to females, so that the
effective mortality cost of care is larger for the more common sex. For the same reasons, rm→competing juv on
the right-hand side of eq. (A4) is also reduced when males are the common sex, reducing the fecundity bene-
fit of increased care for the more common sex. However, rm→competing juv is smaller than rm→locally competing juv
on the left hand side (compare eqns. [S30, S28]), so overall these indirect effects through relatedness suggest
the more common sex should provide less care relative to the rare sex. Overall however, Figure 3A-C shows
that the direct effect of mating skew (via the coefficient nf/nm) favoring more effort by the common sex
overrides the indirect effect via relatedness.
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Effect of communal care
In the case of communal care, parents care for all locally born offspring, so coefficients rf→own juv and
rm→own juv in equations (A3,A4) for the case of individual care are now replaced by the coefficients rf→locally born juv
and rm→locally born juv. Hence, whether focal gene copies benefit from any changes in the focal’s care now de-
pends on mating skew: when males are the more common sex (nm > nf), individual males have a smaller
expected genetic share in the next generation relative to females. As a consequence, a slight increase in a
mutant male’s parental effort is less likely to benefit copies of that mutant gene present in offspring, because
rm→locally born juv becomes smaller relative to rf→locally born juv as nm increases. Going back to eqns. (A3,A4),
communal care substantially reduces the fecundity benefit of effort by the more common sex (right-hand
side), thus offsetting the previously found reduction in the effective mortality cost of increased care by the
more common sex (left-hand side). All in all, the effect of mating skew is therefore largely cancelled out in
taxa with communal care, causing the effects of sex-biased dispersal to prevail (Figures 3D, F).
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Figure captions
Figure 1 Three examples highlighting how sex biases in dispersal can affect sex differences in care, and
possibly even lead to uniparental care (e.g., panel C). Each panel depicts how female effort uf and male effort
um coevolve towards a stable equilibrium, for different combinations of male hm and female philopatry hf.
To assess the course of evolution, start by taking a certain value of male effort um (fixed height on the graph).
Then evolution acting on the level of female effort will tend to decrease it if male effort is too high or increase
it if male effort is too low (the direction of evolution is indicated by the vertical, thick grey arrows). Evolution
of uf in response to this fixed level of male care stops at the corresponding point on the uf isocline (solid
black line), which reflects the evolutionarily stable uf level. A corresponding description applies to the um
isocline, where horizontal, thick grey arrows indicate the direction of selection on um towards the isocline
(dashed black line). The intersection of the isoclines provides a stable level of both efforts, u∗f and u
∗
m (black
dots). Panel A: the baseline case of a well-mixed population with complete migration, in which there are no
sex-differences in care, u∗f = u
∗
m. Panel B: when males are more philopatric than females (hm > hf), males
provide the majority of care to young. Panel C: when males are extremely philopatric in comparison to
females, selection favors males to provide almost all care to young, whereas the amount of female care is
negligible. Parameters: nm = nf = 1, kf = km = 0.1. Light grey lines: individual-based simulations.
Figure 2 The equilibrium amount of total male effort as a proportion of total effort by both sexes u∗m/(u∗m +
u∗f ), for different combinations of philopatry in each sex. At the dashed black contour line, males and
females have identical levels of effort (u∗f = u
∗
m). Panel A: in highly viscous populations with few individuals
per patch (nf = nm = 1), slight sex-biases in philopatry cause pronounced sex-differences in care. In case
sex-biases in philopatry are large, selection favors near uniparental care by the most philopatric sex. Panel
B: in populations with multiple breeding pairs per patch, the effect of philopatry on sex-differences in care is
less pronounced. Nonetheless, even here we find that the most philopatric sex provides the majority of care
to young. Parameters: kf = km = 0.1. See Supplementary Figure S2 for corresponding absolute levels of u∗f
and u∗m.
Figure 3 The equilibrium fraction of male care u∗m/(u∗m + u∗f ) for different degrees of mating skew nm/nf.
Panels A-C: Parents care only for their own offspring. When mating skews occur for parents that care only
for their own offspring, the more numerous sex (i.e., the sex with the lowest reproductive value) provides the
majority of care, regardless of the level of dispersal. Nonetheless, amount of care by a particular sex increases
with its level of natal philopatry. Panels D,F: in case parents provide care for all local offspring, the parameter
space in which the more numerous sex provides most of the care is substantially decreased. Consequently,
the level of philopatry becomes a more important determinant of the degree of sex-specific care, so that often
the philopatric sex provides the majority of care. Parameters: km = kf = 0.1. See Supplementary Figure S3
for the corresponding absolute levels of u∗f and u
∗
m.
Figure 4 The philopatric sex (here males) typically provides the majority of care, even when it has to pay
a far higher mortality cost than the dispersing sex. The equilibrium fraction of male care u∗m/(u∗m +u∗f ) when
varying the cost of male care relative to that of female care, (1−km)/(1−kf) (x-axis) and by varying the level
of male philopatry (y-axis). The black line indicates where both males and females provide identical amounts
of care to their young. With low levels of philopatry, the proportion of male care rapidly declines from a
pattern where males provide the majority of care to cases where females provide most of the care. However,
when male dispersal is limited, males provide the majority of care to the brood, despite high sex-specific
costs of male care. Parameters: nm = nf = 1, df = 0.2,kf = 0.5.
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S1 Supplementary Figures
Figure S1: additional adult mortality due to competition between adults and juveniles The model in
the main text assumed that adults, once they occupy a breeding position, are unaffected by competition with
juveniles. As we raised this issue in the discussion, we relax this assumption by assuming that adult breeders
have to compete with juveniles during every timestep, resulting in an adult mortality cost proportional to the
number of juveniles with which the adult competes. Accounting for such adult-juvenile interactions may
be important in the context of mating skew: as juveniles are born at a 1:1 sex ratio, the rarer sex would
experience relatively more competition by juveniles than the commoner sex, which could potentially reduce
selection for increased survival (and lower care) in the rarer sex. To this end, male and female mortalities are
now given by µm(um) = u2m + 1− exp[−gnf/nm] and µf(uf) = u2f + 1− exp[−g]: here, g is a constant reflecting
the effective amount of competing juveniles of a particular sex in a local patch born from a single female, so
g ·nf reflects the total amount of competing juveniles of each sex. Hence, each breeding male experiences an
effective amount of g ·nf/nm of competition from juveniles, while each adult female experiences g ·nf/nf = g
competing juveniles. Throughout, we assume g = 0.8 to prevent mortality from exceeding 1 when um or uf
become large.
Panels A-C: when parents only care for their own offspring, the effect of adult-juvenile interactions is
limited, as it is still the commoner sex that provides most of the care. However, relative to Figure 3A-C, the
effect of the adult sex ratio (ASR) on sex differences in care is much less pronounced.
Panels D-F: the effect of juvenile-adult interactions become more striking when parents care commu-
nally: Figure 3D, F already showed that communal care reduces selection for care in the commoner sex (as
its care is diluted over an increased number of offspring). In addition, adult-juvenile interactions cause the
commoner sex to experience fewer competitive interactions with juveniles relative to the rarer sex, selecting
for increased survival (and hence reduced care) in the commoner sex. Overall, adult-juvenile interactions
thus further reduce the effect of mating skew.
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Figure S2: sex differences in philopatry and absolute levels of male and female effort Absolute val-
ues for the amount of total female (panels A, B) and male effort (panels C, D) for different combinations
of philopatry in each sex, corresponding to Figure 2 in the main text. First column: in highly viscous
populations with few individuals per patch (nf = nm = 1), slight sex-biases in philopatry cause pronounced
sex-differences in care. In viscous populations, kin competition among adults is intense, leading the more
philopatric sex to value reproductive effort over survival, as the production of a few dispersing offspring is
the only way to escape kin competition in viscous populations (Pen, 2000). Hence, large values of reproduc-
tive effort are selectively favored in the more philopatric sex, while levels of care are slight in the dispersing
sex. Second column: in populations with a higher number of individuals per patch, viscosity is reduced, so
sex differences are less pronounced. Nonetheless, the most philopatric sex still provides the majority of care
to its young. Parameters: kf = km = 0.1.
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Figure S3: absolute levels of male and female effort when parents care for own young or care commu-
nally Absolute values for the amount of total female (panels A-C, G-I) and male effort (panels D-F, J-L)
corresponding to Figure 3 in the main text. When parents only care for their own offspring (panels A-I), note
that the common sex provides more effort to the brood than the rare sex (e.g., panels A and F), as it values
reproductive effort more than survival (see main text). Note that female effort uf is higher when females are
the more common sex than male effort um is when males are the more common sex (compare panel A with
panel F). This asymmetry stems from our assumption (see section “A demographical model of parental care”
in the main text) that offspring in a brood all have the same genetic mother, whereas a male’s genetic share
in a brood to whom he provides care is given by nf/nm. Hence, when males are the more common sex, the
returns on male effort are diluted by a lower average relatedness to their brood. By contrast, when females
are the common sex, female relatedness to her brood is unchanged, resulting in higher relative returns on
maternal care. When parents care for all locally born offspring (communal care, panels G-L), we find that
effort of the more common sex is strongly reduced relative to a scenario where parents only care for their
own offspring (e.g., compare panels A with panel G and panel F with panel L). By contrast, the level of
effort of the rarer sex is less affected by communal care. The reason why the value of effort is particularly
reduced in the common sex is that an individual of the more common sex has a much lower genetic share in
any offspring born in the local patch, relative to the rare sex parent. As a consequence, the value of parental
effort by parents belonging of the more common sex is disproportionately reduced relative to the value of
care by parents belonging to the rarer sex. By contrast, care levels in the rarer sex are much less affected, as
any randomly chosen locally born offspring is much more likely to be one of its own offspring. Moreover,
the rarer sex is already selected to provide a minimum level of effort, as it faces reduced competition for
breeding opportunities relative to the commoner sex (see main text). Parameters: kf = km = 0.1.
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Figure S4: absolute levels of male and female effort when varying the costs of care Absolute values for
the amount of total male (panels A) and female effort (panel B) corresponding to Figure 4 in the main text,
when female philopatry is hf = 0.8. The relative cost of male versus female care is given by (1−km)/(1−kf).
For low levels of male philopatry hm, male care (female care) rapidly decreases (increases) with increasing
relative costs of male care. By contrast, for high levels of male philopatry, we find that male effort is
sustained at relatively high levels despite high relative costs of male care. Only when relative costs of male
care are very high (e.g., (1 − km)/(1 − kf) ≈ 2), do we find that male care evolves to um = 0. Interestingly,
however, for the combination of high costs of male care and high levels of male philopatry (specifically
when hm ≥ 0.8⇐⇒ dm ≤ 0.2), we find that female care only evolves to modest values, resulting in lower
levels of overall care given to the brood. For this combination of parameters, female care only evolves to
modest values because females become the more dispersing sex when hm ≥ 0.8. Consequently, females
are more likely than males to share demes with unrelated individuals, selecting females to reduce levels of
effort (as in dying, a female would be relatively more likely to be replaced by a non-relative). Parameters:
nf = nm = 1, kf = 0.5.
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S2 An evolutionary demographical model of biparental care
Below, we provide a formal description of a demographical model of biparental care for a scenario where
both parents only provide care for their own offspring. In section S2.2 we then derive a version of this model
where care occurs communally (i.e., where parents provide care to all locally born offspring).
S2.1 Fitness equations for uf when parents care for their own offspring
Female fitness The fitness of a focal mutant allele uif while residing in a breeding female is given by
Wf = 1−µf
(
uif
)
+
1
2
wff
(
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ff
f ,u
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)
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where 1−µf
(
uif
)
is the probability that the female breeder bearing the mutant allele survives, while wff and
wfm are the expected number of successfully established daughters and sons she produces (multiplied by 1/2
to reflect the genetic contribution by each parent). The contribution through sons is weighed by the relative
reproductive value of sons versus daughters, vm/vf. Expressions for the reproductive values are derived
below. Expressions for wff and wfm are
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where ufff denotes the average investment level of a local female when the focal copy is borne by a female;
and upopf the population average female investment level. Male care is assumed to be evenly distributed over
his female mates (the average of which is nf/nm), so that the per-brood contribution by a male is um/(nf/nm).
Taking wff as an example, note that any daughters the focal female produces will remain in the natal patch
with probability hf = 1 − df or disperse to a remote patch with probability df. In case mortality of a local
female breeder occurs (average number of local female mortality events per time step: nfµf(ufff )), juvenile
females in the patch compete for a breeding position, which is reflected by the term in the denominator: the
number of juvenile daughters produced by the nf female breeders in the local patch is nfb(ufff +
nm
nf
um), who
remain at the natal patch with probability 1−df. In addition, with probability df immigrant juvenile females
arrive from remote patches (in which fecundity is given by nfb(u
pop
f +
nm
nf
um)). By contrast, the probability
of establishment of a focal daughter that migrated to a remote patch (with probability df) is proportional
to the average number of mortality events of female breeders in the remote patch nfµf(u
pop
f ), and inversely
proportional to the total fecundity of native and immigrant offspring in the remote patch nfb(u
pop
f +
nm
nf
um).
The expression for wfm(uif,u
ff
f ,u
pop
f ) can be derived in a similar fashion.
Male fitness Similarly, fitness of the focal mutant allele uif while residing in a breeding male is given by
Wm = 1−µm (um)+
1
2
wmm
(
ufmf ,u
pop
f
)
+
1
2
vf
vm
wmf
(
ufmf ,u
pop
f
)
, (S4)
S11 Dispersal and sexual conflict over care
where expressions for the expected number of copies of the uif allele in successfully established sons and
daughters are given by
wmm
(
ufmf ,u
pop
f
)
=
nf
nm
b
(
ufmf +
nm
nf
um
)
nm
nf
×
 (1−dm)µm (um)
b
(
ufmf +
nm
nf
um
)
(1−dm)+b
(
upopf +
nm
nf
um
)
dm
+
dmµm (um)
b
(
upopf +
nm
nf
um
)
 (S5)
wmf
(
ufmf ,u
pop
f
)
=
nf
nm
b
(
ufmf +
nm
nf
um
)
×
 (1−df)µf (ufmf )
b
(
ufmf +
nm
nf
um
)
(1−df)+b
(
upopf +
nm
nf
um
)
df
+
dfµf
(
upopf
)
b
(
upopf +
nm
nf
um
)
 , (S6)
where ufmf denotes the average investment level of a local female when the focal gene copy is borne by a
male. wmm and wmf can be derived in a similar fashion as eqns. (S2, S3), but note that b(ufmf +
nm
nf
um) reflects
a focal male’s fecundity with a single female, which should thus be multiplied by a male’s total number of
mates nf/nm.
S2.1.1 Fitness equations for um when parents care for their own offspring
Similar to the equations in the main text, we have the following expressions for the fitness of a focal allele
uim that determines male parental investment:
Wf = 1−µf (uf)+
1
2
wff
(
umfm ,u
pop
m
)
+
1
2
vm
vf
wfm
(
umfm ,u
pop
m
)
(S7)
Wm = 1−µm
(
uim
)
+
1
2
wmm
(
uim,u
mm
m ,u
pop
m
)
+
1
2
vf
vm
wmf
(
uim,u
mm
m ,u
pop
m
)
, (S8)
where
wff
(
umfm ,u
pop
m
)
= b
(
uf +
nm
nf
umfm
)
(S9)
×
 (1−df)µf (uf)
b
(
uf + nmnf u
mf
m
)
(1−df)+b
(
uf + nmnf u
pop
m
)
df
+
dfµf (uf)
b
(
uf + nmnf u
pop
m
)
 (S10)
wfm
(
umfm ,u
pop
m
)
= b
(
uf +
nm
nf
umfm
)
nm
nf
×
 (1−dm)µm (umfm )
b
(
uf + nmnf u
mf
m
)
(1−dm)+b
(
uf + nmnf u
pop
m
)
dm
+
dmµm
(
upopm
)
b
(
uf + nmnf u
pop
m
)
 (S11)
wmm
(
uim,u
mm
m ,u
pop
m
)
=
nf
nm
b
(
uf +
nm
nf
uim
)
nm
nf
×
 (1−dm)µm (ummm )
b
(
uf + nmnf u
mm
m
)
(1−dm)+b
(
uf + nmnf u
pop
m
)
dm
+
dmµm
(
upopm
)
b
(
uf + nmnf u
pop
m
)
 (S12)
wmf
(
uim,u
mm
m ,u
pop
m
)
=
nf
nm
b
(
uf +
nm
nf
uim
)
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×
 (1−df)µf (uf)
b
(
uf + nmnf u
mm
m
)
(1−df)+b
(
uf + nmnf u
pop
m
)
df
+
dfµf (uf)
b
(
uf + nmnf u
pop
m
)
 . (S13)
S2.2 Fitness equations in case care is communal
In case parents care for all locally born offspring, a focal female’s fecundity is now a function of the average
female and male care levels in the local patch. Consequently, when a female bears the focal allele, her
fecundity is given by b(ufff +
nm
nf
um), where ufff denotes the parental effort averaged over all local female
breeders, when the focal gene copy is borne by a female. Consequently, the same transition probabilities
wff and wfm from eqns. (S2,S3) apply here, with the difference that a focal’s effort uif is substituted by the
average effort ufff . Equations for wmm and wmf from eqns. (S5,S6) are unchanged.
Similarly, when considering expressions for the expected number of offspring bearing allele um, expres-
sions for wff and wfm are unaltered relative to eqns. (S11, S11). In the expressions for wmm and wmf (eqns.
S12, S13) we replace uim by u
mm
m , the level of effort averaged over all local male breeders when the focal
gene copy is borne by a male.
S2.3 Reproductive values
We derive a 2×2 matrix P, entries of which the probability pi j that a gene copy present in an individual of
sex i is derived (by survival or reproduction) from a gene copy in an individual of sex j in the previous time
step. Hence,
P =
[
pff pfm
pmf pmm
]
=
[
1−µf + 12wff
1
2wmf
1
2wfm 1−µm +
1
2wmm
]
,
so we have (for a fully homogeneous population without mutant alleles)
P =
[
1−µf + 12µf
1
2µf
1
2µm 1−µm +
1
2µm
]
.
From the left eigenvalue of P, we then obtain the class reproductive values cf = µm/(µm + µf) and cm =
µf/(µm +µf). To obtain individual reproductive values for each sex, we use the relationship vi = ci/ui (?), we
divide the class reproductive values ci (i∈ [m, f]) by the class frequencies um = nm/(nm+nf) + uf = nf/(nm+nf)
so that we obtain
vf =
nm +nf
nf
µm
µm +µf
(S14)
vm =
nm +nf
nm
µf
µm +µf
. (S15)
As the total reproductive value is constant, we can scale values so that
vm =
1
nmµm
(
u∗m
) , vf = 1nfµf (u∗f ) , (S16)
which facilitates the interpretation of the selection gradients in eqns. (A1-A4); see Appendix.
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S2.4 Relatedness
Let Qi j denote the average coefficient of relatedness among two randomly chosen adult breeders of sexes i
and j. We then have the following recursions
Qff,t+1 = (1−µf (uf))2Qff,t
+2µf (uf) (1−µf (uf))hf
1
2
[
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
Qff,t +Qfm,t
]
+µf (uf)2 h2f
(
1
4
[
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
Qff,t
]
+
1
2
Qfm,t +
1
4
[
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
Qmm,t
])
(S17)
Qfm,t+1 = (1−µm (um)) (1−µf (uf))Qfm,t
+µf (uf) (1−µm (um))hf
1
2
[
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
Qmm,t +Qfm,t
]
+µm (um) (1−µf (uf))hm
1
2
[
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
Qff,t +Qfm,t
]
+µf (uf)µm (um)hfhm
×
(
1
4
[
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
Qff,t
]
+
1
2
Qfm,t +
1
4
[
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
Qmm,t
])
(S18)
Qmm,t+1 = (1−µm (um))2Qmm,t
+2µm (um) (1−µm (um))hm
1
2
[
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
Qmm,t +Qfm,t
]
+µm (um)2 h2m
(
1
4
[
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
Qff,t
]
+
1
2
Qfm,t +
1
4
[
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
Qmm,t
])
. (S19)
The first equation reflects the coefficient of relatedness Qff,t+1 among two randomly sampled female breeders.
With probability (1−µf)2 both adult female breeders are survivors from the previous time step, in which case
their expected relatedness is equal to Qff,t . With probability 2µf (uf) (1−µf (uf)) one female is a survivor from
the previous time step, whereas the other female is newly born. In this case, both females are only related
when the newborn female is native to the local patch, with probability hf. With probability 1/2 the newborn
received its gene copy maternally and with probability 1/2 paternally. In case of maternal inheritance, with
probability 1/nf the newborn female is a daughter of the sampled, surviving female. The probability that
both gene copies are identical by descent is then 1. With probability (nf − 1)/nf, the newborn female is a
daughter of one of the other breeding females in the local patch, so that the probability that both gene copies
are identical by descent is given by Qff,t . In case the newborn received the gene copy from her father, the
probability that the newborn’s gene copy is identical by descent to the surviving female is rfm. Finally, with
probability (1−µf (uf))2, both sampled females are newly born and with probability h2f to the local patch.
With probability 1/4, both females received their gene copies maternally. In case both females are born
from the same mother (with probability 1/nf) the identity by descent is 1. By contrast, when both females
are born from different mothers (with probability (nf −1)/nf), the probability of identity by descent of both
gene copies is given by Qff,t . Alternatively, with probability 1/2 one gene copy is paternally inherited and
one maternally inherited, in which case the identity by descent is given by Qfm,t . Finally, with probability
1/4 both gene copies are paternally inherited. With probability 1/nm both females share the same father
and hence the probability that both gene copies are identical by descent is 1. In case both are born from
different fathers (with probability (nm −1)/nm) the probability of identity by descent is given by Qmm,t . The
expressions for Qfm,t+1 and Qmm,t+1 can be derived in a similar fashion.
Equilibrium values Qˆff, Qˆfm and Qˆmm can be easily obtained from the above equations. However, results
are lengthy and not particularly insightful, so we do not display these equilibria here. We then use the
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equilibrium values to calculate average values of relatedness rff, rfm and rmm that are used in the selection
gradients below. Specifically, we have
rff =
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
Qˆff (S20)
rmm =
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
Qˆmm (S21)
rfm = Qˆfm. (S22)
S2.5 Selection gradients
We derive selection differentials that determine the rate of evolutionary change in um and uf using a direct
fitness approach (Hamilton, 1964b; Taylor and Frank, 1996; Taylor et al., 2007)
dW
duf
=
[
cf
(
∂Wf
∂uif
+ rff
∂Wf
∂ufff
)
+ rfmcm
∂Wm
∂ufmf
]∣∣∣∣
upopf =u
fm
f =u
ff
f =u
i
f
(S23)
dW
dum
=
[
cm
(
∂Wm
∂uim
+ rmm
∂Wm
∂ummm
)
+ rfmcf
∂Wf
∂umfm
]∣∣∣∣
upopm =ufmm =uffm=uim
, (S24)
where the class reproductive values are cf = cm = 12 .
S2.6 Equilibrium condition when individuals care for their own offspring
Solving for the equilibrium condition where both selection gradients vanish (dW/duf = 0,dW/dum = 0), we
have [
1−
1
2
hf
(
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
rff + rfm
)]
µ′f
(
u∗f
)
µf
(
u∗f
)
=
[
2
(
1
2
(1+ rfm)−
(
h2f +h
2
m
)
2
1
2
(
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
rff + rfm
))] b′uf (u∗f + nmnf u∗m)
b
(
u∗f +
nm
nf
u∗m
) (S25)
[
1−
1
2
hm
(
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
rmm + rfm
)]
µ′m
(
u∗m
)
µm
(
u∗m
)
=
nm
nf
[
2
(
1
2
(1+ rfm)−
(
h2f +h
2
m
)
2
1
2
(
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
rmm + rfm
))] b′um (u∗f + nmnf u∗m)
b
(
u∗f +
nm
nf
u∗m
) . (S26)
Now substituting on the left-hand side rself = 1 and
rf→locally competing juv =
1
2
hf
(
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
rff + rfm
)
(S27)
rm→locally competing juv =
1
2
hm
(
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
rmm + rfm
)
, (S28)
which denote the average relatedness of a focal female or focal male breeder to locally competing juveniles
of the same sex, and on the right-hand side
rf→own juv = rm→own juv =
1
2
(1+ rfm) ,
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which denotes the average relatedness of a focal female (or male) breeder to its own offspring (averaging
across both sexes of young), and
rf→competing juv =
1
2
(
h2f +h
2
m
)
2
(
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
rff + rfm
)
(S29)
rm→competing juv =
1
2
(
h2f +h
2
m
)
2
(
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
rmm + rfm
)
, (S30)
which denote the relatedness between a focal female (or male) breeder and any competing offspring of the
same sex that are displaced by the focal’s own offspring (again averaging over both sexes of young), we
obtain equations (A3, A4) in the main text.
S2.7 Equilibrium condition when care is communal
For communal care we obtain a similar equilibrium condition as in eqns. (S25, S26):[
1−
1
2
hf
(
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
rff + rfm
)]
µ′f
(
u∗f
)
µf
(
u∗f
)
=
[
2
(
1
2
(
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
rff + rfm
)
−
(
h2f +h
2
m
)
2
1
2
(
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
rff + rfm
))] b′uf (u∗f + nmnf u∗m)
b
(
u∗f +
nm
nf
u∗m
) (S31)
[
1−
1
2
hm
(
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
rmm + rfm
)]
µ′m
(
u∗m
)
µm
(
u∗m
)
=
[
2
(
1
2
(
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
rmm + rfm
)
−
(
h2f +h
2
m
)
2
1
2
(
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
rmm + rfm
))] b′um (u∗f + nmnf u∗m)
b
(
u∗f +
nm
nf
u∗m
) . (S32)
Hence, this leads to the same equilibrium condition as in eqns. (A3, A4), with the difference that rf→own juv
and rm→own juv are replaced by
rf→locally born juv =
1
2
(
1
nf
+
nf −1
nf
rff + rfm
)
(S33)
rm→locally born juv =
1
2
(
1
nm
+
nm −1
nm
rmm + rfm
)
. (S34)
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S3 Coevolution of parental care and the sex ratio
Below we provide a brief exploration of the evolutionary dynamics of parental care when allowing for the
evolution of the sex ratio. We first ask how parental care affects previous results on equilibrium sex ratios in
viscous populations, after which we consider how the sex ratio affects sex differences in care.
For the sake of simplicity, we consider the simplest possible scenario in which brood sex ratios are
controlled by the mother rather than the individual offspring (Pen, 2006) and parents only care for their own
young. Analogous to eqns. (S1, S4), we then have the following expressions for the fitness of a focal allele
zi that is present in a focal female (or male) and determines the proportion of sons in her (or his) offspring:
Wf = 1−µf (uf)+
1
2
wff
(
zi,zff,zpop;uf
)
+
1
2
vm
vf
wfm
(
zif,z
ff
f ,z
pop
f ;um
)
(S35)
Wm = 1−µm (um)+
1
2
wmm
(
zmf,zpop;um
)
+
1
2
vf
vm
wmf
(
zmf,zpop;uf
)
, (S36)
where zff (and zmf) is the average proportion sons produced by all females in the local patch when the focal
allele copy is borne by an adult female (male) and zpop is the average proportion sons produced by the rest
of the population. We then have
wff
(
zi,zff,zpop;uf
)
=
(1−df)
(
1− zi
)
µf (uf)
(1−df)
(
1− zff
)
+df (1− zpop)
+
df
(
1− zi
)
µf (uf)
(1− zpop)
(S37)
wfm
(
zi,zff,zpop;um
)
=
nm (1−dm)ziµm (um)
nf
[
(1−dm)zff +dmzpop
] + nmdmziµm (um)
nfzpop
(S38)
wmm
(
zmf,zpop;um
)
=
nf
nm
(
nm (1−dm)zmfµm (um)
nf
[
(1−dm)zmf +dmzpop
] + nmdmzmfµm (um)
nfzpop
)
(S39)
wmf
(
zmf,zpop;uf
)
=
nf
nm
(
(1−df)
(
1− zmf
)
µf (uf)
(1−df)
(
1− zmf
)
+df (1− zpop)
+
df
(
1− zmf
)
µf (uf)
(1− zpop)
)
. (S40)
The evolutionary change in the proportion of sons z is then given by
dW
dz
=
[
cf
(
∂Wf
∂zi
+ rff
∂Wf
∂zff
)
+ rfmcm
∂Wm
∂zfm
]∣∣∣∣
zpop=zfm=zff=zi=z
, (S41)
with the relatedness coefficients given by eqns. (S20-S21) resulting in the equilibrium sex-ratio strategy
z∗
1− z∗
=
1
2 (1+ rfm)−
1
2 (1−dm)
2
(
1
nf
+ nf−1nf rff + rfm
)
1
2 (1+ rfm)−
1
2 (1−df)
2
(
1
nf
+ nf−1nf rff + rfm
) . (S42)
When substituting for the values of rff and rfm (eqns. [S20,S22]) and assuming that generations are non-
overlapping, the above result is identical to previous expressions of equilibrium sex ratios in viscous pop-
ulations (e.g., eq. [4] in Pen, 2006; see also Frank, 1986; Wild and Taylor, 2004). The expression above
shows that the sex ratio is always biased towards the more dispersing sex, as it is least likely to compete
with relatives relative to the philopatric sex. Figure S5 shows that sex ratios become even more biased to-
wards the dispersing sex when the sex ratio coevolves with parental care. This is because our model on
parental care necessarily assumes overlapping generations (as current reproductive success trades off with
future reproduction: Trivers, 1972). Such overlapping generations increase relatedness among relatives, thus
exacerbating the probability that the philopatric sex competes with relatives. Consequently, mothers are
selectively favored to bias investment even more strongly towards the dispersing sex.
S17 Dispersal and sexual conflict over care
We then ask whether biased sex ratios have any effect on the equilibrium level of female u∗f and male
care u∗m. However, it is straightforward to see that adding the equilibrium sex ratio z∗ to eqns. (S2-S12) has
no effect, because sex ratio terms in numerator and denominator cancel out against each other in each of the
aforementioned equations.
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Figure S5: A comparison of the proportion sons z∗produced in the current model (dark grey) versus a model
without parental care (Frank, 1986; Wild and Taylor, 2004; Pen, 2006) (light grey). Parameters: km = kf = 0.1
when parental care is present and km = kf = 1.0 when parental care is absent.
